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ENHANCING THE FIGHTING FORCE:
MEDICAL RESEARCH ON AMERICAN SOLDIERS
Catherine L. Annas* & George J. Annas**
Be all that you can be, and a lot more.
- DARPA's revision of a U.S. Army recruiting slogan.
During President Barack Obama's first primetime press conference,
reporters asked primarily about the state of the economy and terrorism.
Wedged between questions on these two vital issues was a query from the
Washington Post's Michael Fletcher:
Question: What is your reaction to Alex Rodriguez's admission that
he used steroids as a member of the Texas Rangers?
Obama: You know, I think it's depressing news.... And if you're a
fan of Major League Baseball, I think it - it tarnishes an entire era, to
some degree. And it's unfortunate, because I think there are a lot of
ballplayers who played it straight. And, you know, the thing I'm
probably most concerned about is the message it sends to our kids.
What I'm pleased about is Major League Baseball seems to finally be
taking this seriously, to recognize how big a problem this is for the
sport, and that our kids hopefully are watching and saying, "You
know what? There are no shortcuts, that when you try to take
shortcuts, you may end up tarnishing your entire career, and that your
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integrity's not worth it." That's the message I hope is
communicated.1
Situating the use of steroids by baseball players on the same level as the
economic meltdown in the U.S. and the war in Afghanistan may seem
strange, but less than two weeks later in his weekly Op-Ed column in the
Sunday New York Times, Frank Rich produced a similar list of what he saw
as the major evils that were denied during the Bush administration:
"Steroids, torture, lies from the White House, civil war in Iraq, evenrecession ....",2 As to steroid denial in particular, Rich noted, "[a]nyone
with eyes could have seen that Sammy Sosa and Mark McGwire resembled
Macy's parade balloons in their 1998 home-run derby . . . ."3 And in its
February 23rd issue, the cover of the New Yorker featured a portrait of Alex
Rodriguez signing autographs for young children whose arms were bloated
like balloons.
As we will explore in this Article, some ethicists think that the concem
about drugs used for "enhancement," including steroids used by baseball
players to increase their strength, is misplaced, and that adult athletes should
be able to use whatever enhancers they want, so long as they are not
dangerous to their health.4 Putting aside for a moment the health dangers of
steroids on adults-which are contested-the other two primary reasons for
banning the use of performance enhancers in baseball are that they are, as
President Obama noted, a form of cheating that undermines the integrity of
the game, and that they encourage emulation by children.
Sports has been the primary arena in which what might be termed the
"enhancement debate" has played out, and, at least until the publication of
the Mitchell report in late 2007, most of the attention focused on the
Olympics and devising ways to detect cheating by athletes who were using
drugs.5 In George Mitchell's recounting, as well as a recent survey by the
Wall Street Journal, the two teams that had the most players who used
steroids were George W. Bush's old team, the Texas Rangers, and the New
I. Transcript: Obama Takes Questions on Economy, CNNPolitics.com (Feb. 9,
2009), http://www.cnn.com/2009IPOLITICS/02/09/obama.conference.transcript.
2. Frank Rich, Op-Ed., What We Don't Know Will Hurt Us, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22,
2009, at WKI0.
3. Id. See also, Michael S. Schmidt, Inside a Tempting World of Easy Steroids,
N.Y. TIMES, April 12, 2009, at Al.
4. See infra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
5. See GEORGE J. MITCHELL, REPORT TO THE COMMISSIONER OF BASEBALL OF AN
INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATION INTO THE ILLEGAL USE OF STEROIDS AND OTHER
PERFORMANCE ENHANCING SUBSTANCES BY PLAYERS IN MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL (Dec.
13, 2007), http://assets.espn.go.com/media/pdf/071213/mitchell-report.pdf [hereinafter
MITCHELL REPORT].
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York Yankees. 6  As Red Sox fans, we can, of course, be accused of
prejudice, especially against the Yankees. So it is probably best we leave
the sports debate to others. Instead, our focus in this Article is on the use of
performance enhancing drugs in the arena that bracketed the Alex Rodriquez
question to the president: the war against terrorism, and specifically the
unasked question regarding the use of "enhancement" drugs by U.S. soldiers
in combat.
MILITARY ENHANCEMENTS: SCIENCE OR SCIENCE FICTION?
In his 1959 novel Starship Troopers, Robert Heinlein envisions a future in
which soldiers take drugs to eliminate fear and wear "powered armor" body
suits. The suits, as described by a soldier in the book, "give us better eyes,
better ears, stronger backs . . . better legs, more intelligence . . . more
firepower, greater endurance, less vulnerability." 7 The suit is said to make
the soldier "look like a big steel gorilla, armed with gorilla-sized weapons." 8
It weighs a ton, "yet from the very first time you are fitted into one you can
immediately walk, run, jump, lie down, pick up an egg without breaking it...
and jump right over the house next door .... The secret lies in negative
feedback and amplification." 9 Military physicians remain essential, because
"if my suit gets really sick, I call the doctor-a doctor of science
(electromechanical engineering) who is a staff Naval officer .... 10
Heinlein's body suit remains in the realm of science fiction, but since
Sputnik and the formation of the Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency (DARPA), research has continued on enhancing America's soldiers.
In his 2007 novel Breakpoint, published fifty years after Starship Troopers,
former counterterrorism official Richard Clarke envisions what the results of
DARPA's current research might look like as soon as 2012. The combat
suits under development enable their wearer to jump eight feet in the air or
bounce twenty feet ahead, they are flexible and lightweight yet capable of
stopping bullets, and can also give the wearer a sedative or call for an
ambulance when necessary:
The standard medicine kit can keep you awake for seventy two hours
with no side effects. You could lift a small car with one arm. You
don't have X-ray vision, but you do have telescopic and night vision.
You're directly wired to the Internet, so all the knowledge in the
6. See id; Matthew Fetterman, Why Everything is Bigger in Texas, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 20, 2009, at W5. See also Tyler Kepner, As Team Looks On, Rodriguez Details His
Use of Steroids, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2009, at BI & B15.
7. ROBERT A. HEINLEIN, STARSHIP TROOPERS 81 (Ace Books 1987) (1959).
8. Id. at 80.
9. Id. at 101.
10. Id. at 82.
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world is instantly available to you and you can talk, chat, text, or e-
mail anyone anywhere. You are part of the connected
consciousness. I
Washington Post reporter Joel Garreau summarized DARPA's current
"super soldier" projects based on interviews with DARPA personnel.
DARPA researcher Michael Goldblatt described the future soldier:
Soldiers having no physical, physiological, or cognitive limitations
will be the key to survival and operational dominance in the future ....
Indeed, imagine if soldiers could communicate by thought alone ....
Imagine the threat of biological attack being inconsequential. And
contemplate, for a moment, a world in which learning is as easy as
eating, and the replacement of damaged body parts as convenient as a
fast-food drive-through.. .these visions are the everyday work of the
Defense Services Office [of DARPA].
12
DARPA's projects include a program called "Persistence in Combat" that
aims to create soldiers who are "unstoppable" because pain, wounds and
bleeding are kept under their control. Specifics include a search for a "pain
vaccine" that will block intense pain within ten seconds, using photo-
biomodulation to accelerate wound healing, and designing a chemical
cascade to stop bleeding within minutes. Other projects seek to promote
limb regeneration, attempt to emulate dolphin and whale brain activity in
order to "create a '24/7' soldier--one that can easily navigate, communicate
and make good decisions for a week without sleep," to help produce
"operational dominance," and to create a universal pathogen killer that can
neutralize any known pathogen.
13
Although these projects seek to create a new kind of soldier, the most
frequent model used for enhancements in existing literature is the athelete,
specifically top Olympic athletes. For example, the "metabolically dominant
soldier" project aims to make soldiers the metabolic equivalent of Olympic
athletes: "to have strength and endurance that doesn't quit. The Energizer
Bunny in fatigues kind of does it. Keeps going and going."'1 4 The slogan for
the project is "Be all that you can be and a lot more."' 15 Other projects
involve brain to computer interfaces, and a wearable suit that would provide
the soldier with greatly enhanced strength, and enable the wearer to run at
Olympic sprinter speed for hours and do seven foot vertical leaps.
16
11. RICHARD A. CLARKE, BREAK POINT 144 (2007).
12. JOEL GARREAU, RADICAL EVOLUTIONq: THE PROMISE AND PERIL OF ENHANCING
OUR MINDS, OUR BODIES -AND WHAT IT MEANS TO BE HUMAN 22-23 (2005).
13. Id. at 26-29.
14. Id. at 32.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 36-41. See generally Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency,
http://www.darpa.mil (last visited April 3, 2009).
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The motto of the American military physician is "to conserve the fighting
force."' 7 This means caring for the physical and mental health needs of
soldiers in combat so they are fit to fight, to continue fighting, or to return to
the battlefield after treatment. 18 Although the motto is unmodified, today
there is a notable shift in emphasis in the American military toward
"enhancing the fighting force." The primary enhancement is technological,
and includes not only improved military weapons, planes, tanks, and
armored vehicles, but also new body armor and sensors, as well as a new
generation of combat robots. These robots are to act as force multipliers and
to perform missions deemed too dangerous or complicated for human
soldiers. The ethics of fighting robots is only beginning to be explored,
although science fiction cautions us that artificial intelligence is likely to
overtake human intelligence in the not too distant future.
19
Unlike Heinlein, Clarke assumes that enhancements developed by the
U.S. military will be quickly adopted for civilian use. With this assump-
tion, Clarke raises a central question in the entire enhancement debate: are
military enhancements different in kind and rationale such that they should
only be applied to soldiers fighting wars, or are they part of a continuum of
enhancements that should have broad application to all humans? Of course,
if military enhancements are seen as unique, we will need to find a way to
prevent their use in the civilian world, or not pursue them at all if such
prevention is impossible. Related to this question is the role of the military
physician, specifically with regard to whether the military physician's role is
17. George J. Annas, Military Medical Ethics-Physician First, Last, Always, 359
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1087, 1089 (2008).
18. See generally OFFICE OF THE SURGEON GENERAL, U.S. ARMY, MILITARY MEDICAL
ETHICS (Thomas E. Beam & Edmund G. Howe eds., 2003) [hereinafter MILITARY
MEDICAL ETHICS].
19. See, e.g., Noel Sharkey, The Ethical Frontiers of Robotics, 322 SCIENCE 1800
(2008). It is worth noting that we have moved a long way since Isaac Asimov first
proposed "laws" for robots to ensure that they would always work with humans and not
against them, and that they were absolutely prohibited from ever killing or even harming
a human:
(1) a robot may not injure a human being, or through inaction, allow a human
being to come to harm; (2) a robot must obey the orders given to it by human
beings except where such orders would conflict with the first law; and (3) a
robot must protect its own existence as long as such protection does not conflict
with the first or second laws.
ISAAC AsIMov, Runaround, in I, ROBOT 40 (1950). See also Asimov's robot novels: THE
CAVES OF STEEL (1953);. THE NAKED SUN (1957); and THE ROBOTS OF DAWN (1983). See
also HANS MORAVEC, MIND CHILDREN: THE FUTURE OF ROBOT AND HUMAN
INTELLIGENCE (1988).
20. CLARKE, supra note 11, at 142-43.
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the same in the realm of enhancements as it is in the realm of treatment. If
there are differences, what are they and on what basis can they be justified?
We begin by summarizing the enhancement debate, examining the major
supporting cases used in it - soldiers and surgeons. We conclude with a
discussion of enhancement research in the military and make
recommendations regarding the role of military physicians, which we
suggest should be applied to physicians generally - including in the area of
enhancements.
THE ENHANCEMENT DEBATE
The two primary goals of medicine have always been to treat disease and
alleviate suffering. Human embryonic stem cell research has been the most
politically controversial medical research because it involves the destruction
of human embryos to obtain stem cells. Nonetheless, most Americans see
this as acceptable because the potential benefits are so large: the treatment of
a variety of currently incurable serious diseases through regenerative
medicine.21 Treating individuals who are sick or "abnormal" to return them
to "normal" functioning is uncontroversial. Nonetheless, it is worth noting
that the "norm" referred to here is both a fact (as in a normal human being),
and a value (how the individual sees him or herself).
22
Enhancements are often said to be different in kind because they attempt
to take a normal or well human being and make him or her "better." And the
term itself seems to prejudge the conclusion, rather than state one possible
outcome of research. In this regard it is similar to using the term "therapy"
in the phrase "gene therapy" since this is a hope, not a reality: we are
currently limited to doing gene transfer experiments, which may one day
result in therapeutically useful genetic interventions. Likewise, the term
"enhanced" has come to mean not better, but something altogether different
in contemporary politics. The best (or worst) example is probably the Bush
administration's use of the term "enhanced interrogation" to refer to torture.
President George W. Bush's Council on Bioethics was thus correct to
observe that the term "enhancement" is itself "highly problematic . . .
abstract, and imprecise," and that "all successful therapies are enhancing,
even if not all enhancements enhance by being therapeutic." 3 The Council
21. See, e.g., GEORGE P. SMITH, II, DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE AND THE NEW MEDICINE
52-54 (2008). See also Larry Rohter, Back and Forth on Stem-Cell Research Energizes
Race, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2008, at A20.
22. GEORGES CANGUILHEM, THE NORMAL AND THE PATHOLOGICAL 125 (Zone Books
1989) (1966).
23. PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, BEYOND THERAPY: BIOTECHNOLOGY AND
THE PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS 15-16 (2003). See also ERIK PARENS, ED., ENHANCING
HUMAN TRAITS: ETHICAL AND SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS (Georgetown U. Press 1998).
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worried most that enhancements would be effective and would be used to
such an extent that they would ultimately change what it meant to be
human-and in a negative way. In the Council's words:
We might come to see human running and dog races, singers and
synthesizers, craftsmen and robots, as little different from one
another. Human beings, here mostly for our entertainment or our use,
might become little more than props or prop-makers. We might lose
sight of the difference between real and false excellence, and
eventually not care. And in the process, the very ends we desire
might become divorced from any idea of what is humanly superior,
and therefore humanly worth seeking or admiring. We would become
a society of spectators, and our activity mere spectacle. Or a society
of parasites, needing and talking, but never doing or acting. Worst of
all, we would be in danger of turning our would-be heroes into slaves
24
The Council was particularly worried about enhancements that make us look
and act younger to try to cheat death, and how we might use enhancements
on our children to make them "better." As to drugs, the Council's concern
was that we would all wind up drugging ourselves to feel good, not unlike
the "soulless," contented-cow characters from Huxley's Brave New World.25
The Council did not address in any detail the possible military
applications of enhancements, even though these are the ones under the most
intense development, the ones most likely to be used, and following initial
use and some evidence of safety, the ones most likely to find application in
the civilian population. Of course, with the country engaged in two
unpopular wars, perhaps the Council did not want to say or do anything that
might offend the Bush administration that created and nurtured the Council.
Nonetheless, the Council did ask some relevant questions on this topic:
When the very existence of the human agent or human society is at
stake, certain special superior performances are not only edifying but
urgent: for example, the superior performance of soldiers or doctors.
What guidance, if any, does our analysis provide for such moments of
extreme peril and consequence, in war or in medicine, when superior
performance is a matter of life or death? Are some biotechnical
interventions to enhance performance justified in these activities
(war, surgery) while not justified in the other activities of human life
(sports, music, test-taking)? In these circumstances, might we treat
men as alterable artifacts--or willingly become artifacts ourselves-
in order to 'get the job done'?
26
24. Id. at 155-56.
25. See generally ALDOUs HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD (HarperCollins Pub. 2006)
(1932).
26. PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON BIoETHics,supra note 23, at 154 (emphasis added).
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Aside from the remarkable conflation of surgeons and soldiers, the
Council ignores these questions by answering a different one, arguing that
we should break out of our "boundaries" even for serious reasons, "only
with disquiet, overriding boundaries rather than abandoning them, and
respecting certain ultimate limits to ensure that we remain human even in
moments of great crisis."2 7 The Council then goes on to undercut its own
basic argument by seeming to say that as long as soldiers do become de
facto robots, enhancements are acceptable:
Even if they existed, and even in times of great peril, we might resist
drugs that eliminate completely the fear or inhibition of our soldiers,
turning them into 'killing machines' (or 'dying machines'), without
trembling or remorse. Such biotechnical interventions might improve
performance in a just cause, but only at the cost of making men no
different from the weapons they employ.
28
The Council's report was published in 2003, and since then the Council
has itself been characterized as anti-science and embryo-centric to the point
of being out of touch with both science and society. 29 Thus, it was no great
surprise that when in late 2008 a highly-discussed commentary encouraging
the use of drugs to produce "cognitive enhancement" (primarily in students
and other test-takers) appeared in a leading science journal, Nature, the
authors dismissed the Council's entire enhancement report (and similar
arguments by others) in three sentences. The first sentence summarized
the major objections to enhancements generally (short circuiting personal
agency and undermining the value of human effort), the second sentence
restated the Council's observation that there are important differences
between traditional and biotechnological means of human enhancement, and
the third sentence concluded, without argument, and based on a sole citation
to a highly opinionated work of one of the co-authors, "[s]uch arguments
have been persuasively rejected.'
27. Id.
28. Id. at 154-55. Elsewhere in the report the Council worries about how the use of
drugs that induce fearlessness would undermine character traits we now value, writing,
"[p]eople who take pills to block out from memory the painful or hateful aspects of a new
experience will not learn how to deal with suffering or sorrow. A drug that induces
fearlessness does not produce courage." Id. at 291.
29. See generally George J. Annas & Sherman Elias, Politics, Morals and Embryos:
Can Bioethics in the United States Rise Above Politics?, 431 NATURE 19 (2004).
30. Henry Greely et al., Towards Responsible Use of Cognitive-Enhancing Drugs by
the Healthy, 456 NATURE 702, 703 (2008).
31. Id. Co-author John Harris's book is ENHANCING EVOLUTION: THE ETHICAL CASE
FOR MAKING BETTER PEOPLE (2007). Other Nature co-authors seem much less
enthusiastic about the future of brain "enhancement" drugs when interviewed separately.
Martha Farah, for example, told Margaret Talbot, "I'm a little concerned that we could be
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According to the Nature commentators, only three issues are relevant to
the use of drugs such as Ritalin and Adderall to improve concentration and
test-taking ability: a risk-benefit analysis that lets competent adults make
their own decision regarding use; concerns about coercion involving
children, soldiers, and employees; and (assuming they work) a fairness
principle that would provide access to everyone who wanted them to
minimize "enhancement-related socioeconomic disparities." 32 Although the
commentators reject the report of the President's Bioethics Council, they
ultimately wind up in the same space by their almost identical use of
examples without discussion or analysis: soldiers and surgeons. In their
words:
Questions of coercion and autonomy are particularly acute for
military personnel and for children. Soldiers in the United States and
elsewhere have long been offered stimulant medications including
amphetamine and modafinil to enhance alertness, and in the United
States are legally required to take medications if ordered to for the
sake of their military performance. For similar reasons, namely the
safety of the individual in question and others who depend on that
individual in dangerous situations, one could imagine other
occupations for which enhancement might be justifiably required. A
hypothetical example is an extremely safe drug that enables surgeons
to save more patients. Would it be wrong to require this drug for
risky operations?
33
We leave it to others to comment on whether it is more offensive to equate
the situation of soldiers to that of children, or the situation of a surgeon
taking care of massive casualties on the battlefield to one simply doing a
"risky" operation. We can, however, draw at least one clear conclusion from
both the President's Bioethics Council and the Nature commentators:
although they see themselves as radically different, both of them use the case
of soldiers and surgeons without data and with little or no thought, and
neither seem to have any idea of what the law is regarding physicians and
soldiers in the United States Armed Forces. We will examine the relevant
law on the military, and especially physicians in the military, in the final
section of this Article. First, we explore an area all commentators agree is
critical, but none have spent much effort exploring - the question of safety
raising a generation of very focused accountants." Talbot herself concluded,
"Neuroenhancers are perfectly suited for the anxiety of white-collar competition in a
floundering economy.. .Neuroenhancers don't offer freedom. Rather they facilitate a
pinched, unromantic, grindingly efficient form of productivity." Margaret Talbot, Brain
Gain: The Underground World of 'Neuroenhancing' Drugs, THE NEW YORKER, April
27, 2009, 32, 40, 43.
32. Greely et al., supra note 30, at 704.
33. Id. at 703 (emphasis added).
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and how it might be determined in the area of enhancements. Our primary
concern is with the two recurring examples (used by the President's Council
as possible exceptions to their general prejudice against enhancers, and used
by the Nature commentators as prime examples of uncontroversial uses of
enhancers) of what seem to be candidates for quasi-mandatory enhancement:
soldiers and surgeons.
ENHANCEMENT AND SAFETY: ENHANCING ALERTNESS IN SOLDIERS AND
SURGEONS
Perhaps the enhancement most sought after by the widest variety of
populations is the ability to remain alert for long periods of time. At the
extreme, this ability has been celebrated in science fiction, with one author
suggesting that people genetically-engineered to require no sleep at all
would quickly take over the world. In the real world, a number of
population groups are susceptible to the use of amphetamines to stay awake
during work or other tasks: college students cramming for exams,35
athletes, 36 commercial pilots during long shifts, 37 physicians, 38 and military
personnel. The military and medical justifications for using amphetamines
in this way are more persuasive than a student or an athlete - soldiers are in
life-threatening situations where their senses need to be sharp, and surgeons
holds the lives of others in their hands. Nonetheless, there are also
compelling safety considerations when talking about amphetamine use by
professionals such as surgeons or, to use a specific military example,
military pilots. These safety risks should not simply be assumed away, even,
we think, for the sake of argument.
34. See generally Nancy Kress's "sleepless trilogy": NANCY KRESS, BEGGARS IN
SPAIN (1993), BEGGARS AND CHOOSERS (1994), and BEGGARS RIDE (1996).
35. See Christian Teter et al., Illicit Use of Specific Prescription Stimulants Among
College Students: Prevalence, Motives and Routes of Administration, 26
PHARMACOTHERAPY 1501 (2006).
36. Amphetamine use among professional athletes has been rumored for years.
"Amphetamine like stimulants" were connected to the deaths of Korey Stringer of the
Minnesota Vikings and Steve Bechler of the Baltimore Orioles. MITCHELL REPORT,
supra note 5, at 22.
37. Use of amphetamines by commercial pilots is prohibited. 14 C.F.R. Part 121
Appendix I (2008) defines "prohibited drug" as "marijuana, cocaine, opiates,
phencyclidine (PCP), and amphetamines .... " 53 Fed. Reg. 40,724 (Nov, 1, 1988)
(establishing the Final Rule codified at 14 C.F.R. Part 121 Appendix I and describing the
purpose of the drug testing program as the identification of individuals in safety-sensitive
positions who may have used "prohibited drugs").
38. Michael Wilkes, Are Doctors Using Performance Enhancing Drugs?,
SACRAMENTO BEE, Oct. 19, 2008, at 5L.
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Amphetamine's common side effects include fast heartbeat, tremors,
headache and dizziness. 39 Insomnia is another side effect. When used by
military personnel, these "go pills," which are used to keep personnel awake
and alert during missions that are particularly long or conducted during
normal sleeping hours,40 must often be counterbalanced by the use of "no-
go" pills (or sedatives) to allow the personnel to sleep when they have the
time to do so in between missions.4 1  GlaxoSmithKline notes in its
prescribing information for Dexedrine, an amphetamine officially sanctioned
by the U.S. Air Force for pilot use, that "[a]mphetamines may impair the
ability of the patient to engage in potentially hazardous activities such as
operating machinery or vehicles ....,42
Military Pilots
Looking only at amphetamine use during missions (and setting aside the
issue of long-term effects in post-military life), safety questions persist.
43
For example, are there predictable side effects of drug use such as "tremors"
or "dizziness" that could be counter-productive to a mission? We want
military personnel to be alert and awake as much as possible in order to
protect themselves, their comrades, and to carry out their missions in the
most effective way. The question is whether those goals are diminished by44
use of amphetamines. While documentation of cases of preventable death
caused by use of drug enhancements in the military is rare, the case of
Tarnak Farms is unusually well-documented, which is why we adopt it for
review.
39. GLAXOSMITHKLINE, DEXEDRINE PRESCRIBING INFORMATION 10 (July 2008),
http://us.gsk.com/products/assets/us_dexedrine.pdf.
40. Greg Miller, Air Force May Have a Bitter Pill to Swallow in 'Friendly Fire'
Incident, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2003, at A 16 (including discussion by Col. Alvina Mitchell,
a U.S. Air Force spokesperson, on this use of amphetamines).
41. MICHAEL FRISCOLANTi, FRIENDLY FIRE: THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE U.S.
BOMBING THAT KILLED FOUR CANADIAN SOLDIERS IN AFGHANISTAN 25 (2005).
42. GLAXOSMITHKLINE, supra note 39, at 4. For an excellent description of the
major friendly fire incident in the Iraq war, and an explanation of it as a systems failure,
see generally ScOTT SNOOK, FRIENDLY FIRE: THE ACCIDENTAL SHOOTDOWN OF U.S.
BLACK HAWKS OVER NORTHERN IRAQ (2000).
43. The U.S. Air Force prescribes dextroamphetamines to pilots to stay awake during
missions. FRISCOLANTI, supra note 41, at 24.
44. Retired Admiral Eugene Carroll, former Vice President of the Center for Disease
Information, who took amphetamines during his service in World War II, was quoted in
2003 as saying: "If pilots are pushed so hard they have to take these drugs on a regular
basis, they are going to get stressed out and have an unsafe result." Elliot Borin, The U.S.
Military Needs its Speed, WIRED, Feb. 10, 2003, available at http://www.wired.com/
medtech/health/news/2003/02/57434.
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Tamak Farms refers to a friendly fire incident that occurred during the
first year of the war in Afghanistan.45 The incident involved two U.S. Air
46Force F-16 pilots who were flying over Afghanistan. The pilots were just
about to return to their base in Kuwait after a ten-hour patrol. One of the
pilots believed that he saw surface-to-air fire. He sought clearance from
flight control to drop a bomb, and about thirty-five seconds later dropped a
500 pound bomb onto the site. Soon after, flight control answered his
request with a denial of authorization and information that "friendlies" were
in the area. Those "friendlies" were Canadian soldiers conducting a firing
exercise at the site, Tarnak Farms. Tragically, four of the Canadian soldiers
were killed and eight were wounded in this incident.
47
Air Force pilots routinely need to make split-second decisions such as the
one made by the pilot in this case. But in this particular situation, there were
built-in safety Procedures that might have prevented this tragedy had they
been followed. The pilot thought he was being fired on. There was also
testimony that he and his partner had not been briefed about "friendlies"
conducting exercises in that area prior to their mission. 49 In addition, U.S.
45. FRISCOLANTI, supra note 41, at 44-49. The incident took place in the Tarnak
Farms area of Afghanistan, just outside of Kandahar, on April 17, 2002.
46. The pilots are Harry Schmidt and William Umbach. The focus of this article's
brief synopsis of the incident will be on Major Schmidt's actions. He will be referred to
in the body of the paper as "the pilot." The purpose is to explore the possible effects of
amphetamine use on the performance of military pilots in general, and not to seek to
determine Major Schmidt's guilt or innocence in this case. Although that issue has been
officially resolved according to the U.S. Air Force, there are a number of factors that
implicate the failings of the military that night as much as or more so than the specific
actions of Major Schmidt. See FRISCOLANTI, supra note 41, at 4; Miller, supra note 40.
47. FRISCOLANTI, supra note 41, at 3-7.
48. Air Force procedure in such a situation calls for a pilot to exit the area to reassess
if danger is perceived but clearance for bombing has not yet been given. The pilot in this
case was a "wingman," and not in command of the mission. Therefore, his only option
for non-clearance or non command action was to proceed in "self defense." Under
procedures, this option gives the pilot authority to proceed, and the pilot in this case did
radio that those were his intended actions. Although there was disagreement in this case
about whether the Standing Rules of Engagement for the U.S. Forces requires such
evacuation and re-evaluation under the circumstances, Col. John Odom, who was the lead
prosecutor in the case, acknowledged that if Major Schmidt felt he was acting in self
defense that would allow him to ignore that requirement. FRISCOLANTI, supra note 41, at
477.
49. During their debriefing after the incident both pilots said they had not been
briefed about friendlies in the area. FRISCOLANTI, supra note 41, at 82. In addition,
during the investigation, Major Marshall Scott Woodson, III, who was the defensive duty
officer the night of April 17, testified that he did not know that there were friendlies
around Kandahar that night. Id. at 379.
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Air Force pilots had been warned about Taliban surface-to-air fighting in
that area, and had also been provided information about the beheading of
captives by the Taliban.
Given these facts, it is conceivable that this pilot's judgment was
reasonable under the circumstances. In fact, five F-16 pilots testified during
an Article 32 hearing to investigate the incident that the pilot had followed
reasonable procedure under the circumstances. 50  However, the letter of
reprimand accompanying the pilot's dereliction of duty finding (part of his
final punishment ) noted that he "rashly decided that the target was an
enemy firing position" and that he had "exhausted his patience" waiting for
52clearance from flight control to drop the bomb. During the investigation,
the pilot presented as a defense that he and the other pilot in the incident had
been told by superiors to use amphetamines during their missions.
53
Although the use of Dexedrine may have affected their behavior, this
friendly fire incident cannot be explained away simply because the pilots
were on "speed." Many other safety lapses in the military patrol system
contributed to the incident. For example, a number of communications
failures occurred that night, including the critical detail that the pilots had
not been briefed prior to that mission about any planned live fire drills by
coalition forces in the area.54 They had, however, recently been briefed to
beware of Taliban ambushes in the Kandahar area. 55 Since Air Force policy
supported and arguably encouraged the use of Dexedrine, it is possible that
Air Force officials thought they had to vigorously defend their
"enhancement" policy and to ensure that the incident was not blamed on
drug use. This would have given them a motive to scapegoat the two pilots,
who ultimately became victims of this catastrophe themselves.
Colonel Peter Demitry, Chief of the United States Air Force Surgeon
General's Science and Technology Division, has referred to prescribing
50. The events of that night (April 17, 2002), as well as the subsequent investigations
and their aftermath, are examined extensively in FRISCOLANTI, supra note 41.
51. The other major part of the pilot's punishment was that he was no longer allowed
to fly Air Force aircraft. FRISCOLANTI, supra note 41, at 480.
52. The Letter of Reprimand was issued on July 6, 2004. Major Schmidt's appeal
was denied by Air Force General Hal Homburg on August 3, 2004. Harry Levins,
Punishment for Pilot Involved in Friendly Fire Bombing Upheld, ST. Louis POST
DISPATCH, Aug. 3, 2004; Harry Levins, Pilot Loses Appeal in Fatal Friendly Fire, ST.
Louis POST DISPATCH, Aug. 4, 2004, at A7. See also FRISCOLANTI, supra note 41, at
478-80.
53. FRISCOLANTI, supra note 41, at 432.
54. Id. at 421,428.
55. Id. at 420.
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amphetamines for pilots as the "gold standard for anti-fatigue." 56 From a
hypothetical viewpoint (since there is no proof that the Air Force actually
tried to use the two pilots as scapegoats), if an investigation into the incident
focused more on the communications failures and "forced" use of
amphetamines, rather than the specific actions of the pilot in a very short
period of time, the Air Force may have had much more of a problem with
both the Canadian government in explaining this major error, and with the
medical community for its continued use of a potentially hazardous drug
during missions. It is much more convenient in a case like this to brush the
incident off as rash pilots behaving in an arrogant way, rather than perform a
complete system review that might raise more generic safety problems.
There are also problems with the pilot error or overreaction scenario.
These pilots had years of experience, and one is a former "Top Gun"
instructor.57 While no pilot is perfect, it is possible that the pilot's reaction
time and loss of patience in this case could have been partially affected by
the cumulative effect on the brain that repeated use of amphetamines at the
direction of supervisors may have taken.
5T
If the military's use of amphetamines was sporadic or not recommended
by the top ranks, and just a tool that individual pilots or soldiers could use in
limited circumstances, any potential harm might be outweighed by the
benefits. The benefits of alertness that these drugs bring can be very useful
for both the pilots and the Air Force in general, and therefore for the
American people overall in terms of protection. Nonetheless, safety risks
should be given at least as high a consideration as the benefits. Given that
the military is overstretched59 and with anecdotal evidence of rising
56. Lianne Hart, Air Force Rushes to Defend Amphetamine Use, THE AGE, Jan. 18,
2003, http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2003/01/17/1042520778665.html.
57. FRISCOLANTI, supra note 41, at 16.
58. Pilots for whom "go pills" are prescribed are required to sign a consent form that
lists the risks and contains the following language: "It has been explained to me and I
understand that the U.S. Food & Drug Administration has not approved the use of
dextroamphetamine to manage fatigue .... My decision to take dextroamphetamine
is/will be voluntary. I understand that I am not being required to take the medication."
Id. at 25. This form was signed by the pilots involved in the Tarnack Farms incident. See
INFORMED CONSENT FOR OPERATIONAL USE OF DEXEDRINE, found in PERFORMANCE
MAINTENANCE DURING CONTINUOUS FLIGHT OPERATION: A GUIDE FOR FLIGHT SURGEONS,
NAVNED P-6410, Jan. 1, 2000.
59. In 2008, 31% of active duty Army personnel served more than one tour in Iraq or
Afghanistan. BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, IRAQ INDEX: TRACKING VARIABLES OF
RECONSTRUCTION & SECURITY IN POST-SADDAM IRAQ 28 (Feb. 19, 2009),
http://www.brookings.edu/saban/-/media/Files/Centers/Saban/raq%201ndex/index.pdf.
The Iraq Index is updated weekly. The longer exposures to combat situations is also
reflected in increasing rates of posttraumatic stress disorder, suicide, divorce and use of
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amphetamine use in the military, it may be that the military is at a point
where there is no choice but to ask pilots or soldiers to use such drugs when
their sleep/wake cycles must be manipulated because of added missions.
Nonetheless, it is reasonable to conclude that there are real safety risks
associated with the use of alertness drugs in the military. Real research on
both the short and long-term effects of these drugs should be conducted
before they become part of routine medical use in the military. Such
research should examine not only the effect of drugs on the pilot's ability to
execute his or her mission, but also on whether the long-term effects of the
drug negatively affect the pilot's ability to return to civilian life.
Physician Fatigue
Those whose performance is most closely linked to military pilots, as
suggested by both the President's Bioethics Council and the Nature
commentators, are physicians, especially surgeons who must endure long
operations. This is due to the fact that performing their professional duties is
directly linked to the lives and safety of their patients. Before focusing on
the special circumstances of surgeons, it is worth reviewing a famous case of
physician fatigue that encouraged policy-makers to focus on patient safety.
In 1984, eighteen-year-old Libby Zion died in the Emergency Room at
Cornell Medical Center in New York.60 As the result of this tragedy, the
Bell Commission was formed to review resident duty hours and
recommended that resident duty hours in New York be limited.61 This was
the first widely-publicized case where a patient death could have been the
direct result of actions by overtired, overworked, and under-supervised
medical residents. It began a long policy discussion between those who
argue that patient safety is adversely impacted by fatigue caused by long
work schedules of residents and nurses, and those who argue that the
educational, training and continuity-of-care benefits of long hours outweigh
the risks.
In 2003, the Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education
62(ACGME) issued resident duty hour limitations. However, work hours are
prescription narcotics among combat veterans. See, e.g., THOMAS E. RICKS, THE GAMBLE:
GENERAL DAVID PETRAEUS AND THE AMERICAN MILITARY ADVENTURE IN IRAQ, 2006-
2008, at 304 (Penguin Press 2009); INST. OF MED., TREATMENT OF POSTTRAUMATIC
STRESS DISORDER (Washington, D.C., National Academies Press 2008).
60. INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT. ACAD., RESIDENT DUTY HOURS: ENHANCING SLEEP,
SUPERVISION AND SAFETY 20 (Cheryl Ulmer, Dianne Miller Wolman & Michael M.E.
Johns eds., 2008).
61. Id.
62. Id. These standards were revised in 2007. ACCREDITATION COUNS. FOR GRAD.
MED. EDUC., COMMON PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS (2007).
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not the only factor that increases fatigue in the hospital work setting.
Resident workloads have also become more intense in the last few
decades.63 Although work hour limitations most likely decrease the level of
fatigue among residents to some degree, fatigue still remains a problem in
the hospital setting and a potential for risk to patients. For example, a study
of nurse working hours found that almost two-thirds of the study's
participants worked overtime "10 or more times during the 4-week study
period. 64 In addition, although some experts believe work hours should be
limited even further, system factors such as financial constraints on hospitals
65and workforce shortages serve as barriers to that goal.
One study using focus groups of medical residents to find out how they
combat fatigue found that drug use was not a major factor.66 However, in
this study, when the issue of prescribed stimulants as a way to combat
fatigue arose in discussions, residents most often reported that they were not
talking about themselves, but had heard of other residents taking
stimulants. 67  This could show hesitancy to admit such use for fear of
discipline or loss of respect among peers.
Some hospitals randomly test employees for drugs; for example,
Massachusetts General Hospital and the Cleveland Clinic randomly test their
68
resident anesthesiologists for drugs. However, these drug tests are
designed to identify impaired anesthesiologists so they can be rehabilitated
and do not harm their patients if they are under the influence of drugs. We
know of no studies on the risks to patients of having physicians use
stimulants to increase alertness, or of the long-term effects on physicians of
stimulant use, although it seems likely that these affects would depend
largely on frequency and dose.
63. Susan Okie, Becoming a Physician: An Elusive Balance - Residents' Work
Hours and the Continuity of Care, 356 NEw ENG. J. MED. 2665, 2665 (2007).
64. Linda Scott et al., Effects of Critical Care Nurses' Work Hours on Vigilance and
Patients'Safety, 15 AM. J. CRITICAL CARE 30, 35 (2006).
65. INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT. ACAD., supra note 60, at 30. A recent Institute of
Medicine report estimated that the cost associated with needed shifting of work loads in
order to further limit resident work hours to be approximately $1.7 billion per year. Id. at
2.
66. Eleanor Stoller et al., Strategies Resident-Physicians Use to Manage Sleep Loss
and Fatigue, MED. EDUC. ONLINE [serial online] 2005;10:9, at 4, http://www.med-ed-
online.org/pdf/res00 1 20.pdf.
67. Id. at 4-5.
68. Lauren Cox, "Urine Drug Tests For Doctors?" ABC News, November 12, 2008.
Enhancing the Fighting Force
Surgeons and Fatigue
Alertness is important for all physicians, but may be particularly
important for surgeons, especially those who perform long operations. A
study using a virtual reality surgical simulator to test the performance of
surgical residents during acute sleep deprivation found that fatigue was
associated with "increased errors" in performing surgical skills on the
simulator.69 A study by researchers from Arizona State University found
that pre-operative "warm up exercises" can be useful to surgeons in
combating fatigue.7 °
There is also some evidence that surgeons have a lower level of awareness
regarding the effect fatigue can have on performance. In a survey of
residents at University of Toronto teaching hospitals, surgical residents were
more likely to report working more hours than non-surgeon residents. In
addition, surgical residents were more likely to score higher on a sleepiness
scale and lower on a scale showing perception of sleep deprivation on
performance.
71
As with pilots, the use of stimulants by surgeons poses safety risks that
support the need for serious research on risks to both surgeons and patients
before it is adopted or accepted as practice. 72 Such studies will need first to
determine whether use by surgeons is safe for patients, at least when
compared to the risks associated with fatigue. Next, studies should consider
the effects of short-term and long-term use on the individual surgeon.
Clinicians should be cautious in turning to a drug option as a solution to
fatigue. As noted, fatigue is a consequence of an over-stressed healthcare
system, and the long-term solutions for this problem are likely to be found in
reforming the healthcare system itself. Moreover, if drug use is valorized,
we risk further distraction from the main issue-which is providing
solutions for surgeons to benefit from the most effective treatment of
fatigue-sleep.
69. Brian Eastridge et al., Effect of Sleep Deprivation on the Performance of
Simulated Laparoscopic Surgical Skill, 186 AM. J. SURGERY 169, 173 (2003).
70. Kanav Kahol et al., Effect of Short-Term Pretrial Practice on Surgical
Proficiency in Simulated Environments: A Randomized Trial of the "Preoperative Warm-
Up " Effect, 208 J. AM. C. SURGEONS 255, 255 (2009).
71. Sarah 1. Woodrow et al., Differences in the Perceived Impact of Sleep
Deprivation Among Surgical and Non-surgical Residents, 42 MED. EDUC. 459, 459
(2008).
72. Oliver Warren et al., The Neurocognitive Enhancement of Surgeons: An Ethical
Perspective, 12 J. SURGICAL RESEARCH 761, 763 (2008).
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RESEARCH ON THE UNENHANCED SOLDIER
We have suggested that there are serious safety issues that have not been
adequately addressed in the enhancement debate, especially where drug
enhancements promoted to increase alertness and decrease the need for sleep
are concerned. This means that more research on such enhancements is
necessary if they are to be pursued at all. Although many commentators
want to take safety for granted so they can discuss what they see as more
interesting questions involving enhancements, there does seem to be basic
agreement that any enhancement that is to be promoted or adopted widely
should meet basic safety standards. Safety can only be proven by well-
designed research trials. What rules should enhancement research follow?
The Nature commentators cite Jonathan Moreno as exclusive support for
the proposition that soldiers are "legally required to take medications if
ordered to . . . . This considerably overstates not only what Moreno
wrote, but also the actual law as it pertains to soldiers. First, what Moreno
actually stated was as follows:
Soldiers aren't normally asked for their informed consent before
accepting what their command regards as the best preparation for
battle. If the question is a purely moral one, then it's difficult to see
why these AugCog [augmenting cognition] enhancements should be
regarded differently from anything else a soldier can be legally
ordered to do.
74
Elsewhere in his book, Moreno notes, "freedom-of-choice arguments have
more traction in an all-volunteer army than in a force of draftees." 75 But the
issue of a soldier's consent to enhancements is much more complex than
either the Nature commentators or Moreno make it; the issue involves not
only the autonomy of soldiers in this context, but also the ethics of military
physicians as well. This is an issue that has received additional scrutiny in
the context of the global war on terror.
Military Medical Ethics
The global war on terror has brought renewed attention to the question of
whether physicians in the U.S. military are physicians first, soldiers first, or
physician-soldiers--or whether some other formulation best describes their
medical-ethical obligations. The chair of the President's Council on
Bioethics, Edmund Pellegrino, has insisted that medical ethics are and must
73. Greely et al., supra note 30, at 703.
74. JONATHAN D. MORENO, MIND WARS: BRAIN RESEARCH AND NATIONAL DEFENSE
53 (2006).
75. Id. (citing, among others, Dr. Evan G. DeRenzo & Richard Szafranski, Fooling
Mother Nature: An Ethical Analysis of and Recommendations for Oversight of Human-
Performance Enhancements in the Armed Forces, AIRPOWER J., at 30 (Summer 1997)).
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be the same for civilian and military physicians, "except in the most extreme
exigencies., 76 Pellegrino argues that there are no special medical ethics for
active-duty military physicians any more than there are for Veterans Affairs
physicians, National Guard physicians, public health physicians, prison
physicians, or managed care physicians. The only question is whether there
are "extreme exigencies" that justify physicians' suspension of their medical-
ethical obligations; an analogous question to another asked (but not
answered) by the President's Council: are there life and death situations that
justify the use of "enhancements" in soldiers and surgeons?
It is not surprising that wars have produced battlefield situations in which
suspending patient-centered medical ethics has seemed reasonable, at least to
military commanders. Perhaps the best-known example from World War I1
is the decision during the North African campaign to provide penicillin first
to troops with sexually transmitted diseases, rather than to seriously
wounded troops, because the former could be quickly returned to combat. In
the first Gulf War, the primary medical-ethical problem was whether military
necessity justified physicians in prescribing investigational drugs without the
informed consent of troops. In the war on terror, controversy has centered
on the participation of physicians in prisoner interrogations and hunger
strikes and, most recently, on the use of psychotropic medications to retain
soldiers in combat areas or return them for another tour of duty. What role
can ethical military physicians play in each of these situations, and how do
they inform the question of enhancement experimentation and enhancement
preparation for battle?
The editors of the textbook Military Medical Ethics conclude that a
military physician is a "Physician First, Officer Second" and that "instances
of significant conflict" between civilian and military medical ethics are "very
rare." 77 This formulation states the problem rather than the solution, since it
is only these "rare" cases involving "military necessity" that could require
military physicians to betray medical ethics in favor of military or national
security concerns. The use of the investigational drug pyridostigmine
bromide as a chemical warfare "pretreatment" during the first Gulf War
illustrates this point. In seeking a Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
"waiver of informed consent" for use of the drug, the Department of Defense
78(DOD) confused military necessity with medical ethics. In that case the
76. Edmund D. Pellegrino, The Moral Foundations of the Patient-Physician
Relationship: The Essence of Medical Ethics, in MILITARY MEDICAL ETHICS, supra note
18 at 17. This section of our Article, "Military Medical Ethics," is adapted from Annas,
supra note 17. Pellegrino's term expires with the Council in September 2009.
77. Pellegrino, supra note 76.
78. See, e.g., George J. Annas, Protecting Soldiers from Friendly Fire: The Consent
Requirement for Using Investigational Drugs and Vaccines in Combat, 24 AM. J. LAW &
MED. 245, 246-47 (1998); contra William FitzPatrick & Lee Zwanziger, Defending
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DOD thought that the FDA had granted permission to use an investigational
drug without informed consent because the drug was seen as safe by the
FDA, whereas the FDA thought that DOD had sought permission to use the
drug without informed consent because they believed the use was required
by military necessity.
79
In the war on terror, military physicians have faced at least three major
challenges to medical ethics: orders that direct them to help interrogate
terrorist suspects using "enhanced interrogation" methods; force-feeding
prisoner hunger strikers at Guantanamo; and certifying soldiers as fit to be
redeployed to Iraq or Afghanistan. The medical-ethics rule in the first two
instances is clear and is reinforced by international human rights standards:
no physician can take part in any action involving torture or cruel or
inhumane treatment, or use medical knowledge or skills for punishment.
The extensive use of physicians by the CIA in torture it conducted in the so-
called black sites was one of the major horrifying findings of a leaked report
of the International Committee of the Red Cross on the interrogations
conducted there with the approval of the president and vice-president.o
As noted previously, the use of the "enhancement" framework was used
here to disguise what was actually happening and to make it look like an
improved method of questioning suspects, rather than a resort to the war
crime of torture. Nor was it just the CIA. In direct contravention of the
ethical standards of the World Medical Association (WMA), the DOD's
post-9/11 interrogation policy required physicians to certify prisoners as fit
for interrogation. Moreover, instructions issued in 2006 explicitly authorize
physicians to certify prisoners as fit for "punishment" and even administer
the punishment if it is "in accordance with applicable law," as interpreted by
the DOD's civilian lawyers.8s
Against Biochemical Warfare: Ethical Issues Involving the Coercive Use of
Investigational Drugs and Biologics in the Military, 3 J. PHIL., Sci. & L. (2003),
http://www6.miami.edu/ethics/jpsl/archives/papers/drugs.html. The long-term effect of
investigational drugs used on veterans of the first Gulf War is still being studied. See,
e.g., RES. ADVISORY COMM. ON GULF WAR VETERANS' ILLNESSES, GULF WAR ILLNESS
AND THE HEALTH OF GULF WAR VETERANS: SCIENTIFIC FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
(2008).
79. Annas, supra note 78.
80. See INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, REPORT ON THE TREATMENT
OF FOURTEEN 'HIGH VALUE DETAINEES' IN CIA CUSTODY (Feb. 14 2007),
http://www.nybooks.com/icrc-report.pdf. See also Mark Danner, The Red Cross Torture
Report: What it Means, N.Y. REV., Apr. 30, 2009, at 48-56; Scott Shane, Report Outlines
Involvement of Medical Workers in Abusive C.I.A. Interrogations, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7,
2009, at A6.
81. U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., INSTRUCTION No. 2310.08E, MEDICAL PROGRAM SUPPORT
FOR DETAINEE OPERATIONS (2006).
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The second example, force-feeding hunger strikers at Guantanamo, has
been justified on the basis of military necessity, and military physicians have
been ordered to force-feed prisoners "for the good of the country."
Additional rationales are: that the prison is an extension of the battlefield;
that hunger strikers are engaged in asymmetric warfare; that allowing them
to die by starvation would be widely viewed as a military failure in the war
on terror that could force the closure of Guantanamo; that physicians should
not allow their patients to die by starvation; and that the prisoners are
incapable of making either an informed refusal (because they are
incompetent) or a voluntary refusal (because of peer pressure). Current
DOD instructions on force-feeding directly contradict the explicit ethical
positions of both the American Medical Association (AMA) and the
WMA.8 2 Yet supporters of the practice have argued that force-feeding, even
with restraint chairs, is consistent with civilian medical ethics as applied in
the U.S. federal prison system; a justification that recognizes that there are
no special medical ethics for the military but fails to acknowledge that many
aspects of medical care in U.S. prisons-including involuntary force-
feeding-may also violate basic standards of medical care and ethics, as well
as the Geneva Conventions, even if they are viewed by U.S. courts as
consistent with the Eighth Amendment.
83
After the election of President Obama and his almost immediate promise
to close Guantanamo within a year, a federal judge accepted the DOD's
argument that continued force-feeding of prisoners at Guantanamo in
restraint chairs was not only consistent with the U.S. Constitution, but also
necessary to protect the safety of the physicians and soldiers doing the force-
feeding. 4  Judge Gladys Kessler did not consider whether use of the
restraint chairs could be considered unlawful medical research,85 or whether
such use violated Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, or even
whether the fact that the military considered the force-feeding of hunger
strikers a risk to them indicated that force-feeding was by definition
medically unnecessary.
86
82. Susan Crosby et al., Hunger Strikes, Force-feeding, and Physicians'
Responsibilities, 298 JAMA 563, 565 (2007) (citing Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557
(2006); George J. Annas, Hunger Strikes at Guantanamo: Medical Ethics and Human
Rights in a "Legal Black Hole," 335 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1377, 1377-82 (2006)).
83. Id. at 565-66.
84. Al-Adahi v. Obama, Civil No. 05-280 (D.D.C. Feb. 10, 2009) (Kessler, J.).
85. See George J. Annas, Human Rights Outlaws: Nuremberg, Geneva, and the
Global War on Terror, 87 B.U. L. REV. 427, 456 (2007).
86. Id. at 456-57; Crosby et al., supra note 82, at 564-65. These issues were also
dodged in a special DOD task force's recent report to President Obama on whether
conditions at Guantanamo met the requirements of Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., REVIEW OF DEPARTMENT COMPLIANCE
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A third example of such an ethical conflict is provided by military
psychiatry. The duration of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the
shortage of troops have required that more troops receive mental health
treatment for serious mental disorders than in previous wars, and suicide
rates of both enlisted personnel and veterans is at an all time high.
Increasingly, soldiers' depression, post-traumatic stress disorder and anxiety
are being treated with newer psychotropic medications, especially selective
serotonin-reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs). There is no military doctrine on the
use of SSRIs in combat situations, but some military psychiatrists have
recommended that their colleagues in Iraq "should consider having one SSRI
in large quantities, to be used for both depressive disorders and anxiety
disorders" to, in the words of the motto of the Army medical corps,
"conserve the fighting strength., 8 7 This strategy is consistent with medical
ethics only if the treatment is part of an overall treatment plan, is medically
indicated, and is provided with the voluntary and informed consent of the
soldier-patient.
At a press conference called to announce the DOD's new policies
regarding the treatment of prisoners on June 7, 2006, then Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs William Winkenwerder said:
We operate under principles of medical ethics. There is no conflict
medically, ethically speaking, in our view, between what we are doing
and what's laid out in a variety of ethical documents in the medical
WITH PRESIDENT'S EXECUTIVE ORDER ON DETAINEE CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT (Feb.
20, 2009), http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/REVIEWOFDEPARTMENT-
COMPLIANCE WITHPRESIDENTSEXECUTIVEORDERONDETAINEECO
NDITIONS OFCONFINEMENTa.pdf. (concluding that force-feeding practices
currently in use at Guantanamo do not violate Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions, while conceding that they do violate medical ethics as set forth by the
World Medical Association, at 56-58).
87. See, e.g., David Benedek, Brett Schneider & John Bradley, Psychiatric
Medications for Deployment: An Update, 172 MIL. MED. 681, 683 (2007); see also
Mentally Ill Troops Sent to Combat, Report Says, BOSTON GLOBE, May 15, 2006, at A3.
It is of some interest that of the two most often used "enhancement" medications in the
current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, one has no scientific basis for helping soldiers
perform their duties, and the other is a commonly used medication for civilians that has
no particular military application. The first is the drug Artan, which is reportedly used by
large numbers of Iraqi soldiers for stress. Mudhafer Al-Husaini & Erica Goode,
Increasingly, Iraqi Soldiers are Abusing Prescription Drugs to Endure Stress of War,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2008, at A28. The other is the very popular drug Viagra, which is
being made available to elderly tribal heads in Afghanistan by the CIA to promote good
will. Joby Warrick, CIA Buys Afghan Chiefs Loyalty with Viagra, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 26,
2008, at A 12.
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world . ... [As for hunger strikes,] we view what we are doing as
largely consistent with that [the WMA's Malta] declaration.
88
Of course, "largely consistent" means that there must be parts that are
inconsistent. As Winkenwerder went on to say, the new policy specifically
authorizes physicians to violate the WMA's Malta Declaration on torture and
hunger strikes when ordered to do so. 89 It may be understandable that the
DOD does not want an international organization to set standards for the
U.S. military. But because medical-ethics standards are universal, the DOD
position should not be acceptable to the medical profession, and the AMA
has appropriately objected to it.90
The DOD's new position that its physicians need not follow nationally and
internationally accepted medical ethics represents a major policy change.
Until now, and at least since Nuremberg, the U.S. military has consistently
operated under the assumption that its physicians are required to follow not
only U.S. medical ethics but also internationally recognized medical ethics.
The U.S. Army's policy concerning medical research on soldiers is
consistent with international medical ethics standards, although Moreno has
argued that the military's description of "exempt" activities leaves room for
possible problems. 91 At Nuremberg, the U.S. military went even further,
asking the AMA to select an expert witness to explain the standards of
medical ethics to the judges at the Nazi doctors' trials. Under existing
military practice, ethics enforcement seems to have been left primarily to
state medical licensing boards, which have tried to avoid investigating ethics
complaints against active-duty military physicians. Unless and until there is
a special federal medical license for the military (not, we believe, a good
idea), state licensing boards should take their responsibility to uphold ethical
88. U.S. DEPT. OF DEFENSE, NEWS TRANSCRIPT, WILLIAM WINKENWERDER,
ASSISTANT SEC Y OF DEF. FOR HEALTH AFFAIRS, MEDIA ROUNDTABLE (June 7, 2006),
http://www.defenselink.mil/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptlD=33.
89. Id.
90. Crosby et al., supra note 82. See Leslie London et al., Dual Loyalty Among
Military Health Professionals: Human Rights and Ethics in Times of Armed Conflict, 15
CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 381, 381-83 (2006); contra MICHAEL GROSS,
BIOETHICS AND ARMED CONFLICT: MORAL DILEMMAS OF MEDICINE AND WAR (2006).
91. Jonathan Moreno, Bioethics and the National Security State, 32 J. L. MED. &
ETHICS 198, 205 (2004) (citing the exemptions the U.S. military claims to human
research rules in its Appendix F, including subsection f: "Individual or group training of
military personnel such as combat readiness, effectiveness, proficiency, or fitness
exercise (for example, Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP), Skill
Qualification Test (SQT)."). See also U.S. DEP'T OF THE ARMY, ARMY REGULATION 70-
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principles much more seriously, as the California legislature has recently
urged .9 2
Pellegrino has emphasized that "medical ethics begins and ends in the
patient-physician relationship" and that there is no military exception to this
rule. 93 Thus, in the case of using SSRIs to prepare troops for redeployment,
the military psychiatrist's loyalty must be to the patient-soldier's mental
health and the prevention of further psychological injury. This conclusion
does not mean that physicians can or should purposely undermine the
military mission by always recommending that their patients not be returned
to combat. Rather, it is based on another judgment: that the U.S. military is
likely to be healthier, both physically and ethically, when its physicians can
consistently follow medical ethics by treating their soldier-patients with
dignity and honor.
There are battlefield and prison conflicts that military physicians must
resolve, but these conflicts are not captured by oversimplified expressions
such as "mixed agency" or "dual loyalty." These frames set up a false
choice. Basic human-rights violations, including torture, inhumane
treatment, and experimentation without consent, can never be justified.
Other conflicts should be analyzed as possible exceptions in extremis to the
rule that medical ethics are universal. The "physician first" guidance is only
half the story; the other half should be "last and always."
These considerations have direct application to research on enhancements,
as well as the use of enhancements in the military that have proven to be
safe. Performing research on humans without their informed consent is a
violation of both current military doctrine and international human rights
law. 94  Soldiers (and military and civilian surgeons) cannot be used as
92. A Resolution passed by the California legislature in 2008 reads in part:
The Legislature hereby requests that when California licensed health
professionals have reason to believe that Interrogations are coercive or
'enhanced' or involve torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or
punishment, they shall report their observations to the appropriate authorities
[and if no action is taken] ... those health professionals are ethically obligated
to report those practices to independent authorities that have the power to
investigate and adjudicate those allegations .... No law, regulation, order, or
exceptional circumstance, whether induced by state of war or threat of war,
internal political instability, or any other public emergency, may be invoked as
justification for torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.
S.J. Res. 19, 1st Sess. (Cal. 2008).
93. Pellegrino, supra note 76, at 5.
94. George J. Annas, The Nuremberg Code in U.S. Courts: Ethics versus
Expediency, in THE NAZI DOCTORS AND THE NUREMBERG CODE 216 (George J. Annas &
Michael A. Grodin eds., 1992). See generally INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, MILITARY
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subjects for research projects without their informed consent-now or
ever.95 Although there are some horrific examples of military experiment-
ation on enlisted personnel, such as the LSD experiments, the military has, at
least since World War I and the Nuremberg Doctors' Trial, had a policy
against experimenting on soldiers without their consent.
96
This is of little concern to DARPA, because DARPA does not conduct
any experiments on humans itself, but rather contracts out this work to the
civilian sector (where, nonetheless, standard rules governing research on
humans apply). DARPA was created to respond to Sputnik, and its greatest
achievement is the Internet. Side excursions into physical enhancements of
soldiers seem now to be at least as important to DARPA as computer
hardware and software once was. Fifty years after its founding, it also seems
reasonable to suggest a complete review of DARPA's research agenda,
especially one that asks just what kind of war does DARPA envision its
"enhanced" soldiers will be fighting? And what reasonable alternatives exist
to changing the physical and mental characteristics of future soldiers for
these future wars?
Heinlin's starship troopers, for example, were specifically designed to
fight a race of aliens that looked (and behaved) like giant bugs. Who does
DARPA think our future enemies are, and why does DARPA think that a
soldier who could control pain, go without sleep for three days or more, and
not need to eat during this time would be useful in fighting this enemy? Our
claim here is not that DARPA is necessarily wrong, but that given our
consistent inability to predict the future of warfare, an open audit of
DARPA's work to date and plans for the future is prudent. This also under-
lines the point that the most important question to ask when planning to
conduct research on humans is whether the research study should be done at
all.
CONCLUSION
In this setting we have suggested that standard safety considerations
should continue to apply, as should standard research rules for informed
consent. We have also noted, using the analogy of physician fatigue and the
patient safety movement, that many problems sought to be solved by current
use of so-called "cognitive enhancers" are actually systems problems, not
MEDICAL ETHICS (2009); PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY COMMITTEE, THE HUMAN RADIATION
EXPERIMENTS (1996).
95. See Annas, supra note 94; INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, MILITARY MEDICAL ETHICS,
supra note 94; PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY COMMITTEE, THE HUMAN RADIATION
EXPERIMENTS, supra note 94.
96. See THE NAZI DOCTORS AND THE NUREMBERG CODE 216 (George J. Annas &
Michael A. Grodin eds., 1992).
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people problems, and as such drugs cannot solve them. Finally we have
suggested that the main driver of the soldier enhancement movement in the
U.S. is DARPA and its science-fiction based research agenda, and therefore,
it makes sense to conduct a public review of DARPA's own view of its
mission, including its view of the future it is trying to design.
This leaves one area of concern suggested by both the President's
Bioethics Council and the Nature commentators: supposing an
"enhancement" has been proven safe in the military or civilian sector, can a
soldier be ordered to take it in preparation for battle, like the soldiers in
Heinlin's Starship Troopers? It seems likely that most soldiers will
volunteer, especially in an all volunteer army, to take whatever their superior
officers recommend. But we do not believe that American soldiers, sent into
battle to uphold American ideals, should ever be compelled to take drugs
they object to. The military rule should be that prescription medications
should never be forced on soldiers, but should be taken only voluntarily, and
only on the advice of a physician who cannot be ordered to prescribe it.
That there is ambiguity in current practice means that adoption of this rule
as doctrine will require a specific directive from the President or the
Secretary of Defense. We recommend a simple one as a conclusion to this
Article: No military physician should ever be obligated to follow any order
that he or she believes in good faith would require a violation of medical
ethics. Put another way, any order that requires a physician to violate
medical ethics is ipsofacto an unlawful order.
